<head>III. The Achaean War</head>When Aurelius Orestes and the other legates returned from the Peloponnesus and informed the senate of what had happened to them
and how they had been very nearly in danger of their lives, both exaggerating the truth and exercising their invention — for they did not represent the danger to which they had been exposed as a fortuitous one, but pretended that the Achaeans had of set purpose determined to make and example of them — the senate was more indignant at the occurrence than it had ever been before, and at once appointed a commission under Sextus Julius Caesar and dispatched it with instructions, however, merely to administer a mild censure for what had taken place, and then to beg and instruct the Achaeans not to give heed in future to those who urged them to the worst courses or to incur before they were aware of it the hostility of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a>, but once again to correct their errors and bring the blame home to the real authors of the offence. This made it quite evident that by the instructions they gave to Aurelius they did not wish to dissolve the League, but to alarm the Achaeans and to deter them from acting in a presumptuous and hostile manner. Some, it is true, thought that the Romans were playing false, as the fate of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Carthage&groupId=441&placeId=820">Carthage</a> was still undecided. This, however, was not the fact; but having for so long acknowledged the League and regarding it as the most loyal of the Greek powers, they thought fit to alarm the Achaeans and curb their undue arrogance, but by no means wished to go to war with them or proceed to an absolute rupture.
Walbank Commentary