Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> and <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Carthage&groupId=441&placeId=820">Carthage</a>, allege as its first cause the siege of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Saguntum&groupId=938&placeId=1673">Saguntum</a> by the Carthaginians
and as its second their crossing, contrary to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber.
I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes,
unless we call Alexander\'s crossing to Asia the cause of his war against <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Persia&groupId=871&placeId=1571">Persia</a> and Antiochus\' landing at <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Demetrias&groupId=536&placeId=1006">Demetrias</a> the cause of his war against <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a>, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true.
For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived?
These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last.
By the beginning of something I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects.
The nature of these is evident from the instances adduced above;
it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and origin of the war against <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Persia&groupId=871&placeId=1571">Persia</a>.
The first was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians ventured to face them.
The second was the crossing of Agesilaus, King of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Sparta&groupId=660&placeId=1208">Sparta</a>, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything owing to the disturbances in Greece.
From both of these facts Philip perceived and reckoned on the cowardice and indolence of the Persians as compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and further fixing his eyes on the splendour of the great prize which the war promised,
he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every preparation for this purpose.
We must therefore look on the first considerations I have mentioned as the causes of the war against <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Persia&groupId=871&placeId=1571">Persia</a>, the second as its pretext and Alexander\'s crossing to Asia as its beginning.
Walbank Commentary