Polybius, Histories

Translation

Book 6 - Chapter 5

<w lemma="%2A%29akribe%2Fsteron">Ἀκριβέστερον</w> <w lemma="me%5Cn">μὲν</w> <w lemma="ou%29%3Dn">οὖν</w> <w lemma="i%29%2Fsws">ἴσως</w> <w lemma="o%28">ὁ</w> <w lemma="peri%5C">περὶ</w> <w lemma="th%3Ds">τῆς</w> <w lemma="kata%5C">κατὰ</w> <w lemma="fu%2Fsin">φύσιν</w> <w lemma="metabolh%3Ds">μεταβολῆς</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="politeiw%3Dn">πολιτειῶν</w> <w lemma="ei%29s">εἰς</w> <w lemma="a%29llh%2Flas">ἀλλήλας</w> <w lemma="dieukrinei%3Dtai">διευκρινεῖται</w> <w lemma="lo%2Fgos">λόγος</w> <w lemma="para%5C">παρὰ</w> <w lemma="%2Apla%2Ftwni">Πλάτωνι</w> <w lemma="kai%2F">καί</w> <w lemma="tisin">τισιν</w> <w lemma="e%28te%2Frois">ἑτέροις</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="filoso%2Ffwn:">φιλοσόφων·</w> <w lemma="poiki%2Flos">ποικίλος</w> <w lemma="d%27">δ᾽</w> <w lemma="w%29%5Cn">ὢν</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="pleio%2Fnwn">πλειόνων</w> <w lemma="lego%2Fmenos">λεγόμενος</w> <w lemma="o%29li%2Fgois">ὀλίγοις</w> <w lemma="e%29fikto%2Fs">ἐφικτός</w> <w lemma="e%29stin">ἐστιν</w>.

<w lemma="dio%2Fper">διόπερ</w> <w lemma="o%28%2Fson">ὅσον</w> <w lemma="a%29nh%2Fkein">ἀνήκειν</w> <w lemma="u%28polamba%2Fnomen">ὑπολαμβάνομεν</w> <w lemma="au%29tou%3D">αὐτοῦ</w> <w lemma="pro%5Cs">πρὸς</w> <w lemma="th%5Cn">τὴν</w> <w lemma="pragmatikh%5Cn">πραγματικὴν</w> <w lemma="i%28stori%2Fan">ἱστορίαν</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="th%5Cn">τὴν</w> <w lemma="koinh%5Cn">κοινὴν</w> <w lemma="e%29pi%2Fnoian">ἐπίνοιαν</w>, <w lemma="tou%3Dto">τοῦτο</w> <w lemma="peiraso%2Fmeqa">πειρασόμεθα</w> <w lemma="kefalaiwdw%3Ds">κεφαλαιωδῶς</w> <w lemma="dielqei%3Dn:">διελθεῖν·</w>

<w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="ga%5Cr">γὰρ</w> <w lemma="a%29%5Cn">ἂν</w> <w lemma="e%29llei%2Fpein">ἐλλείπειν</w> <w lemma="ti">τι</w> <w lemma="do%2Fch%7C">δόξῃ</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="th%3Ds">τῆς</w> <w lemma="kaqolikh%3Ds">καθολικῆς</w> <w lemma="e%29mfa%2Fsews">ἐμφάσεως</w>, <w lemma="o%28">ὁ</w> <w lemma="kata%5C">κατὰ</w> <w lemma="me%2Fros">μέρος</w> <w lemma="lo%2Fgos">λόγος</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="e%28ch%3Ds">ἑξῆς</w> <w lemma="r%28hqhsome%2Fnwn">ῥηθησομένων</w> <w lemma="i%28kanh%5Cn">ἱκανὴν</w> <w lemma="a%29ntapo%2Fdosin">ἀνταπόδοσιν</w> <w lemma="poih%2Fsei">ποιήσει</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="nu%3Dn">νῦν</w> <w lemma="e%29paporhqe%2Fntwn">ἐπαπορηθέντων</w>.

<w lemma=""></w> <w lemma="%2Apoi%2Fas">Ποίας</w> <w lemma="ou%29%3Dn">οὖν</w> <w lemma="a%29rxa%5Cs">ἀρχὰς</w> <w lemma="le%2Fgw">λέγω</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="po%2Fqen">πόθεν</w> <w lemma="fhmi%5C">φημὶ</w> <w lemma="fu%2Fesqai">φύεσθαι</w> <w lemma="ta%5Cs">τὰς</w> <w lemma="politei%2Fas">πολιτείας</w> <w lemma="prw%3Dton">πρῶτον</w>;

<w lemma="o%28%2Ftan">ὅταν</w> <w lemma="h%29%5C">ἢ</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="kataklusmou%5Cs">κατακλυσμοὺς</w> <w lemma="h%29%5C">ἢ</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="loimika%5Cs">λοιμικὰς</w> <w lemma="perista%2Fseis">περιστάσεις</w> <w lemma="h%29%5C">ἢ</w> <w lemma="di%27">δι᾽</w> <w lemma="a%29fori%2Fas">ἀφορίας</w> <w lemma="karpw%3Dn">καρπῶν</w> <w lemma="h%29%5C">ἢ</w> <w lemma="di%27">δι᾽</w> <w lemma="a%29%2Fllas">ἄλλας</w> <w lemma="toiau%2Ftas">τοιαύτας</w> <w lemma="ai%29ti%2Fas">αἰτίας</w> <w lemma="fqora%5C">φθορὰ</w> <w lemma="ge%2Fnhtai">γένηται</w> <w lemma="tou%3D">τοῦ</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="a%29nqrw%2Fpwn">ἀνθρώπων</w> <w lemma="ge%2Fnous">γένους</w>, <w lemma="oi%28%2Fas">οἵας</w> <w lemma="h%29%2Fdh">ἤδη</w> <w lemma="gegone%2Fnai">γεγονέναι</w> <w lemma="pareilh%2Ffamen">παρειλήφαμεν</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="pa%2Flin">πάλιν</w> <w lemma="polla%2Fkis">πολλάκις</w> <w lemma="e%29%2Fsesq%27">ἔσεσθ᾽</w> <w lemma="o%28">ὁ</w> <w lemma="lo%2Fgos">λόγος</w> <w lemma="ai%28rei%3D">αἱρεῖ</w>,

<w lemma="to%2Fte">τότε</w> <w lemma="dh%5C">δὴ</w> <w lemma="sumfqeirome%2Fnwn">συμφθειρομένων</w> <w lemma="pa%2Fntwn">πάντων</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="e%29pithdeuma%2Ftwn">ἐπιτηδευμάτων</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="texnw%3Dn">τεχνῶν</w>, <w lemma="o%28%2Ftan">ὅταν</w> <w lemma="e%29k">ἐκ</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="perileifqe%2Fntwn">περιλειφθέντων</w> <w lemma="oi%28%3Don">οἷον</w> <w lemma="ei%29">εἰ</w> <w lemma="sperma%2Ftwn">σπερμάτων</w> <w lemma="au%29%3Dqis">αὖθις</w> <w lemma="au%29chqh%3D%7C">αὐξηθῇ</w> <w lemma="su%5Cn">σὺν</w> <w lemma="xro%2Fnw%7C">χρόνῳ</w> <w lemma="plh%3Dqos">πλῆθος</w> <w lemma="a%29nqrw%2Fpwn">ἀνθρώπων</w>, <w lemma="to%2Fte">τότε</w> <w lemma="dh%2Fpou">δήπου</w>,

<w lemma="kaqa%2Fper">καθάπερ</w> <w lemma="e%29pi%5C">ἐπὶ</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="a%29%2Fllwn">ἄλλων</w> <w lemma="zw%2F%7Cwn">ζῴων</w>, <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="e%29pi%5C">ἐπὶ</w> <w lemma="tou%2Ftwn">τούτων</w> <w lemma="sunaqroizome%2Fnwn">συναθροιζομένων</w> — <w lemma="o%28%2Fper">ὅπερ</w> <w lemma="ei%29ko%2Fs">εἰκός</w>, <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="tou%2Ftous">τούτους</w> <w lemma="ei%29s">εἰς</w> <w lemma="to%5C">τὸ</w> <w lemma="o%28mo%2Ffulon">ὁμόφυλον</w> <w lemma="sunagela%2Fzesqai">συναγελάζεσθαι</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="th%5Cn">τὴν</w> <w lemma="th%3Ds">τῆς</w> <w lemma="fu%2Fsews">φύσεως</w> <w lemma="a%29sqe%2Fneian">ἀσθένειαν</w> — <w lemma="a%29na%2Fgkh">ἀνάγκη</w> <w lemma="to%5Cn">τὸν</w> <w lemma="th%3D%7C">τῇ</w> <w lemma="swmatikh%3D%7C">σωματικῇ</w> <w lemma="r%28w%2Fmh%7C">ῥώμῃ</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="th%3D%7C">τῇ</w> <w lemma="yuxikh%3D%7C">ψυχικῇ</w> <w lemma="to%2Flmh%7C">τόλμῃ</w> <w lemma="diafe%2Fronta">διαφέροντα</w>, <w lemma="tou%3Dton">τοῦτον</w> <w lemma="h%28gei%3Dsqai">ἡγεῖσθαι</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="kratei%3Dn">κρατεῖν</w>,

<w lemma="kaqa%2Fper">καθάπερ</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="e%29pi%5C">ἐπὶ</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="a%29%2Fllwn">ἄλλων</w> <w lemma="genw%3Dn">γενῶν</w> <w lemma="a%29docopoih%2Ftwn">ἀδοξοποιήτων</w> <w lemma="zw%2F%7Cwn">ζῴων</w> <w lemma="qewrou%2Fmenon">θεωρούμενον</w> <w lemma="tou%3Dto">τοῦτο</w> <w lemma="xrh%5C">χρὴ</w> <w lemma="fu%2Fsews">φύσεως</w> <w lemma="e%29%2Frgon">ἔργον</w> <w lemma="a%29lhqinw%2Ftaton">ἀληθινώτατον</w> <w lemma="nomi%2Fzein">νομίζειν</w>, <w lemma="par%27">παρ᾽</w> <w lemma="oi%28%3Ds">οἷς</w> <w lemma="o%28mologoume%2Fnws">ὁμολογουμένως</w> <w lemma="tou%5Cs">τοὺς</w> <w lemma="i%29sxurota%2Ftous">ἰσχυροτάτους</w> <w lemma="o%28rw%3Dmen">ὁρῶμεν</w> <w lemma="h%28goume%2Fnous">ἡγουμένους</w>, <w lemma="le%2Fgw">λέγω</w> <w lemma="de%5C">δὲ</w> <w lemma="tau%2Frous">ταύρους</w>, <w lemma="ka%2Fprous">κάπρους</w>, <w lemma="a%29lektruo%2Fnas">ἀλεκτρυόνας</w>, <w lemma="ta%5C">τὰ</w> <w lemma="tou%2Ftois">τούτοις</w> <w lemma="paraplh%2Fsia">παραπλήσια</w>.

<w lemma="ta%5Cs">τὰς</w> <w lemma="me%5Cn">μὲν</w> <w lemma="ou%29%3Dn">οὖν</w> <w lemma="a%29rxa%5Cs">ἀρχὰς</w> <w lemma="ei%29ko%5Cs">εἰκὸς</w> <w lemma="toiou%2Ftous">τοιούτους</w> <w lemma="ei%29%3Dnai">εἶναι</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="tou%5Cs">τοὺς</w> <w lemma="tw%3Dn">τῶν</w> <w lemma="a%29nqrw%2Fpwn">ἀνθρώπων</w> <w lemma="bi%2Fous">βίους</w>, <w lemma="zw%7Chdo%5Cn">ζῳηδὸν</w> <w lemma="sunaqroizome%2Fnwn">συναθροιζομένων</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="toi%3Ds">τοῖς</w> <w lemma="a%29lkimwta%2Ftois">ἀλκιμωτάτοις</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="dunamikwta%2Ftois">δυναμικωτάτοις</w> <w lemma="e%28pome%2Fnwn:">ἑπομένων·</w> <w lemma="oi%28%3Ds">οἷς</w> <w lemma="o%28%2Fros">ὅρος</w> <w lemma="me%2Fn">μέν</w> <w lemma="e%29sti">ἐστι</w> <w lemma="th%3Ds">τῆς</w> <w lemma="a%29rxh%3Ds">ἀρχῆς</w> <w lemma="i%29sxu%2Fs">ἰσχύς</w>, <w lemma="o%29%2Fnoma">ὄνομα</w> <w lemma="d%27">δ᾽</w> <w lemma="a%29%5Cn">ἂν</w> <w lemma="ei%29%2Fpoi">εἴποι</w> <w lemma="tis">τις</w> <w lemma="monarxi%2Fan">μοναρχίαν</w>.

<w lemma="e%29peida%5Cn">ἐπειδὰν</w> <w lemma="de%5C">δὲ</w> <w lemma="toi%3Ds">τοῖς</w> <w lemma="susth%2Fmasi">συστήμασι</w> <w lemma="dia%5C">διὰ</w> <w lemma="to%5Cn">τὸν</w> <w lemma="xro%2Fnon">χρόνον</w> <w lemma="u%28poge%2Fnhtai">ὑπογένηται</w> <w lemma="suntrofi%2Fa">συντροφία</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="sunh%2Fqeia">συνήθεια</w>, <w lemma="tou%3Dt%27">τοῦτ᾽</w> <w lemma="a%29rxh%5C">ἀρχὴ</w> <w lemma="basilei%2Fas">βασιλείας</w> <w lemma="fu%2Fetai">φύεται</w>, <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="to%2Fte">τότε</w> <w lemma="prw%2Ftws">πρώτως</w> <w lemma="e%29%2Fnnoia">ἔννοια</w> <w lemma="gi%2Fnetai">γίνεται</w> <w lemma="tou%3D">τοῦ</w> <w lemma="kalou%3D">καλοῦ</w> <w lemma="kai%5C">καὶ</w> <w lemma="dikai%2Fou">δικαίου</w> <w lemma="toi%3Ds">τοῖς</w> <w lemma="a%29nqrw%2Fpois">ἀνθρώποις</w>, <w lemma="o%28moi%2Fws">ὁμοίως</w>

Perhaps this theory of the natural transformations into each other of the different forms of government is more elaborately set forth by Plato and certain other philosophers; but as the arguments are subtle and are stated at great length, they are beyond the reach of all but a few.

I therefore will attempt to give a short summary of the theory, as far as I consider it to apply to the actual history of facts and to appeal to the common intelligence of mankind.

For if there appear to be certain omissions in my general exposition of it, the detailed discussion which follows will afford the reader ample compensation for any difficulties now left unsolved.

What then are the beginnings I speak of and what is the first origin of political societies?

When owing to floods, famines, failure of crops or other such causes there occurs such a destruction of the human race as tradition tells us has more than once happened, and as we must believe will often happen again,

all arts and crafts perishing at the same time, then in the course of time, when springing from the survivors as from seeds men have again increased in numbers

and just like other animals form herds — it being a matter of course that they too should herd together with those of their kind owing to their natural weakness — it is a necessary consequence that the man who excels in bodily strength and in courage will lead and rule over the rest.

We observe and should regard as a most genuine work of nature this very phenomenon in the case of the other animals which act purely by instinct and among whom the strongest are always indisputably the masters —

I speak of bulls, boars, cocks, and the like.It is probable then that at the beginning men lived thus, herding together like animals and following the lead of the strongest and bravest, the ruler's strength being here the sole limit to his power and the name we should give his rule being monarchy.

But when in time feelings of sociability and companionship begin to grow in such gatherings of men, than kingship has struck root; and the notions of goodness, justice, and their opposites begin to arise in men.

Walbank Commentary

Overview

6.4.7 - 6.9.14

(a) The Anacyclosis. In this section P. outlines a schematic sequence of political development, by which the various constitutional forms follow each other in a cyclical succession through a process which P. analyses in detail from 5. 4 onwards. The theory of this is specifically not claimed as original (5. 1 ff.). Recently Ryffel (189 ff.) has traced two separate traditions culminating in P.'s anacyclosis, (a) a theory about the origins of culture which goes back to the sophists and especially to Protagoras, (b) a theory about the causes of corruption in states, which are in general the same for each successive constitutional form (see 7–9 nn.). The details of Ryffel's analysis are given in the separate notes. The concept of metabole in states is old; its germs exist in Solon's theory that anomia leads to tyranny, and it was to counteract such a metabole that the idea of a mixed constitution first arose. But the first man to set out an 'order of states' was Plato. In the Republic (viii. 544 C) the 'best form' (aristocracy or basileia, iv. 445 D) is followed by the Cretan or Laconian state (= timocracy), oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, with the implication that they develop one into another; cf. Rep. v. 449 A, <w lang="el-GR">ἐγὼ μὲν ᾖα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὥς μοι ἐφαίνοντο ἕκασται ἐξ ἀλλή?λων μεταβαίνειν</w>. In the course of a long critique of this passage (Pol. vii (v). 12. 1316 a 1 ff.) Aristotle complains that Plato has failed to explain how the changes come about, and that he has asserted one path of development, whereas in reality almost any change of any constitution into any other is possible (a criticism equally applicable to Aristotle's own succession of constitutions, basileia–aristocracy (politeia)–oligarchy–tyranny–democracy, in Pol. iii. 15. 1286 b 8 ff.; cf. Barker, op. cit., 143 n. 2). But in addition Aristotle points to the absence of any indication of what happens after tyranny, observing (as a reductio ad absurdum) that the logic of Plato's argument would require tyranny to change back into the first, ideal constitution; <w lang="el-GR">οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο ουνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος</w> . Plato does not in fact close the circle, either here or in his further development of the theory of constitutional change in Laws, iii. 677 A ff., iv. 709 A ff.; Ep. vii. 326 B ff.; and Polit. 291 D, E (for though in Laws, iv. 710 D the development of the best state from tyranny is envisaged, the order of thought is somewhat different); but clearly his theories come very close to this step. Similarly, the discussion of constitutional forms by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. viii. 1160 b 10 ff. (basileia–tyranny; aristocracy–oligarchy; timocracy–democracy), though also not yet a 'cycle', comes close to one. It has been suggested that this passage in the Ethics may have been a close forerunner of the Polybian anacyclosis (cf. Ryffel, 172–3; and already Shute apud Newman, ii, introduction xiv); but it is doubtful whether (despite iii. 4. 11) P. was acquainted with the Ethics, and any influence is likely to be indirect. It is indeed only with the combination of the two theories of cultural <milestone unit="page" n="643">[643]</milestone> ascent and constitutional corruption that the full circle is possible; and this is found in no surviving work before P. In the form in which he presents it, the cycle has so many traditional elements that the immediate source is probably past recovery. As to this many suggestions have been made. It has been widely assumed that P. followed Panaetius of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rhodes&groupId=931&placeId=1665">Rhodes</a> (for references see CQ, 1943, 85); and the two men are known to have been fellow-members of the Scipionic circle (Cic. de re pub. i. 34; Vell. Pat. i. 13. 3; Plut. Mor. 814 C–D; Suidas, s.v. <w lang="el-GR">Πολύβιος)</w>. There are, however, chronological difficulties; it is not known whether Panaetius had come to <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> before P. returned to Greece (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 103 n. 3). Furthermore, it is an equally arguable hypothesis that if there was any influence it was in the other direction, with the experienced statesman inspiring the young philosopher (cf. Reitzenstein, Gött. Nachr., 1917. 406 ff.; Pohlenz, RE, 'Panaitios (5)', col. 423). P.'s account of the anacyclosis reveals traces of Stoic terminology (see notes), but this would not be very conclusive at a period of considerable eclecticism; <note type="footnote" id="note1">Mioni (62) draws attention to the presence in <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> in 155 of Diogenes of Seleuceia, Panaetius' teacher and author of a work of a political character (Ath. xii. 526 D; Cic. de leg. iii. 13). P. certainly heard him lecture (xxxiii. 2. 10); but he did not need to wait until then to become acquainted with Stoic doctrines.</note> and in one important particular, the origin of social life, P. adopts a different explanation from the Stoics (5. 7 n.). Another possible milieu with which the anacyclosis may have links is that represented by the second-century works of Hippodamus and 'Ocellus Lucanus' (cf. Ryffel, 203 ff.; von Scala, 237 ff.). 'Ocellus Lucanus' was the author of a schematizing work in which the principles of <w lang="el-GR">γένεσις, ἀκμή</w>, and <w lang="el-GR">τελευτή</w> were developed on various levels to comprise a picture of the universe. The background of this work is disputed. R. Harder (Neue philolog. Untersuchungen, i (Berlin, 1926), Ocellus Lucanus, Text und Kommentar, 30) regards it 'als popularphilosophischen hellenistischen Traktat'. But W. Theiler (Gnomon, 1925, 151; 1926, 151–3, 590 ff.; Hermes, 1953, 300) argues that 'Ocellus' represents a 'ziemlich geschlossenes System'; and he would link the biological cycle in 'Ocellus' with the circle of Critolaus, in view of parallels between 'Ocellus' (14–16) and Philo (aet. mund. 108–12, cf. 57 ff.ultimately from Critolaus). This connexion was already noted by von Scala (243), but Theiler has reinforced it with new passages. Now, according to 'Ocellus', things 'at the highest level' move <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ τόπον</w> only; everything else is subjected to the biological law of <w lang="el-GR">γένεσις ἀκμή</w>, and <w lang="el-GR">τελευτή</w>. Thus at the second level the four elements move <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ μεταβολήν</w> in a Heracleitean flux, described as <w lang="el-GR">ἀντιπερίστασις</w>; at the third level plants move in a cycle of seed, fruit, seed, called <w lang="el-GR">ἐπανάκαμψις</w>; and at the fourth level men and other living creatures <milestone unit="page" n="644">[644]</milestone> pass through a succession of ages. Each of these levels thus reveals a special application of the primary biological law in a form appropriate to its context. The theory of the anacyclosis, Ryffel suggests, may well have arisen in such a milieu; if so, it would represent the specific form in which the biological law expresses itself at the level of political institutions. This milieu, according to Harder, was that of the second-century Peripatos, with a Pythagorean admixture (cf. Ps.-Hippodamus in Stobaeus, iv. 34. 71 = W–H, v. 846); the extent to which it also contained Stoic elements is a matter of dispute between Harder and Theiler. Now, in fact, there is no definite proof that 'Ocellus' and his milieu are directly related to P. at all; and the importance of 'Ocellus' lies in the fact that it provides evidence for a contemporary example, probably of popular philosophizing, which, like P., tries with only partial success to combine the two schemes of growth–acme–decline and of cyclical movementschemes which are to be found united in nature, where the succession of birth, growth, decay, and death in the individual secures the permanence of the species. But to define P.'s source for the anacyclosis more closely seems at present impossible; and no agreement has been reached among recent writers. To Ryffel (201 n. 360) P.'s source is 'mainly Platonizing, but also open to Peripatetic influences'; he does not risk a name; Mioni (66 ff.) derives the doctrine primarily, though not exclusively, from Plato (cf. 5. 1); Regenbogen, RE, Suppl.-B. vii, col. 1519, suggests Theophrastus; and Erbse (Rh. Mus., 1951, 160 n. 1) thinks that Dicaearchus may have been P.'s source for both anacyclosis and mixed constitution. Wilamowitz (Lesebuch, ii. 1. 119), described the anacyclosis as 'eine rationalistische Verwsserung der Platonischen Darstellung, die er gar nicht unmittelbar vor Augen hat'; with its suggestion of Platonic origins and the dilution through a popular intermediary this statement still goes as far as one can go with safety. (b) The anacyclosis and the biological theory. Reference has already been made to the biological theory that all things have their birth, acme, and decline. In its general form this can be traced back to Anaximander (Diels, FVS, i. 12, B 1): <w lang="el-GR">ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών</w> . By Thucydides' time it was a commonplace (cf. Thuc. ii. 64. 3, <w lang="el-GR">πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι)</w>; and by the Hellenistic period it was identified with the Stoic <w lang="el-GR">εἱμαρμένη</w> (cf. Phot. Bibl. cod. 249, 1584 B. (perhaps Agatharchides), <w lang="el-GR">τὸ? ἐκ παιδὸς εἰς μειράκιον ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὰς καθ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἑξῆς ἡλικίας οἰκείως διελθεῖν</w>an example of <w lang="el-GR">εἱμαρμένη)</w>. In several passages (4. 11–13. 9. 11–14, 43. 2, 51. 4–8, 57) P. applies such 'organic' or 'biological' terms to his discussion of the development of the state, e.g. <w lang="el-GR">ἀρχή</w> or <w lang="el-GR">σύστασις, αὔξησις, ἀκμή, φθορά, μεταβολή</w>. This sequence implies that all states (even the mikte) must eventually decline <milestone unit="page" n="645">[645]</milestone> <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w>(cf. 9. 12–14). What is the connexion of ideas between this biological theory and that of the anacyclosis with which it appears in close conjunction? Whether this conjunction was already in existence before P. is uncertain. Theiler (Hermes, 1953, 298; Gnomon, 1926, 590 ff.) argues that it was in Critolaus (cf. Philo, aet. mund. 58 ff., 71); but Critolaus' acquaintance with the anacyclosis has yet to be proved. In any case the relationship between the two concepts in P. requires close analysis. The problem was first raised by Cuntz (40–41) and De Sanctis (iii. 1. 206); and Zancan (Rend. Ist. Lomb., 1936, 508) provided a partial answer by pointing to the concept of <w lang="el-GR">φύσις</w> which P. insists is proper to both the biological development and the anacyclosis (cf. 4. 7 <w lang="el-GR">φυσικῶς</w>, 4. 9 <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w>, 4. 11, 4. 13, 5. 8 <w lang="el-GR">φύσεως ἔργον</w>, and 9. 10 <w lang="el-GR">φύσεως οἰκονομία</w> (both of the anacyclosis), 9. 13, 9. 14, 51. 4 <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w>, 57. 1 <w lang="el-GR">ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκη)</w>. Particularly in 4. 11–13 the two concepts are brought into the closest relationship; yet they cannot be made wholly to coincide, since the biological theory requires an <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w>, and it is only at the cost of some violence that this can be introduced into the anacyclosis. The difficulty is discussed by Ryffel (216 ff.; see also Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 110 ff., 113–15). There are, he observes, three forms which such an <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w> might take. (a) If one considers the whole curve of the anacyclosis, it might well be argued that the <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w> is <w lang="el-GR">βασιλεία</w>, since clearly the <w lang="el-GR">ἀρχή</w> lies in primitive society (cf. 5. 4), and the development through the <w lang="el-GR">μοναρχία</w> to the <w lang="el-GR">βασιλεία</w> is a form of <w lang="el-GR">αὔξησις</w>, and the decline into <w lang="el-GR">τυραννίς</w> represents a <w lang="el-GR">μεταβολή</w>. But, despite the fact that P. devotes all 5–7 to this stage of the cycle, such an identification neglects the further stages, and is therefore unsatisfactory. (b) Inside the single state (e.g. of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a>) P. tends to treat aristocracy as the <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w> (e.g. in 51. 5–6, 57. 8), thus indulging his personal prejudices (cf. 56. 11). But when he is describing the detailed working of the mikte (11–18), he seems rather to exaggerate the real power of the people by putting to their credit the role of the tribunes (16. 4) and the economic activity of the equites (17. 3 ff.), in the interest of his schematic balance. This is against our assuming that the mikte is to be regarded as in some sense weighted towards aristocracy; and in fact 51. 6 merely states that in a mixed constitution at its prime deliberation is part of the function of the aristocratic element (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 117–18). (c) One may apply the biological concept to a single constitutional form; and Ryffel (217) sees some evidence that P. intends this in his use of the doctrine of the <w lang="el-GR">σύμφυτον κακόν</w> inherent in each good form (cf. 4. 8 n., 10. 1 f.). Up to a point this is sound, and is partly supported by such passages as 7. 1 and 8. 1, where it is clear that each phase of the anacyclosis has its own <w lang="el-GR">ἀρχὴ καὶ γένεσις</w> and in turn <milestone unit="page" n="646">[646]</milestone> its destruction. If this is pressed, the problem of an <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w> disappears, each phase having its own <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w>; but if P. meant this, surely he would have said so more clearly. Indeed, the problem of the <w lang="el-GR">ἀκμή</w> is not fully solved until the idea of the mixed constitution has been combined with that of the anacyclosis. It is to this combination that we now turn. (c) The anacyclosis and the mixed constitution. In four passages (10. 7, 10. 11, 10. 14, 11. 1) P. speaks of the mixed constitution in terms implying that it will not last for ever; eventually it must decline <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ? φύσιν</w>, like other states including the ideal state of Plato: cf. Plato, Rep. viii. 546 A, <w lang="el-GR">χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συστᾶσαν. ἀλλ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ πάντι φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται</w>. Consequently there is no fundamental contradiction between the theory of the mixed constitution and that of the organic series, birth, growth, acme, decline (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 107, 112). Indeed, historically the theory of the mixed state arose as the answer to the problem of constitutional change and decay (cf. 3. 7 n., 4. 6 n.); and the ultimate lack of permanence in the mikte made it possible to combine it with the anacyclosis in this book. The existence of any mixed constitution at an historical period ('Lycurgan' <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Sparta&groupId=660&placeId=1208">Sparta</a>, third- and second-century <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a>) explicitly raised the question of its growth, and by implication at least that of its decay. P. wrote book vi as part of his general didactic purpose. His specific reasons are repeatedly stated (iii. 2. 6, 118. 9 f., v. 111. 10, vi. 2. 3, cf. xxxix. 8. 7); they are, briefly, to account for Roman success and world-empire by analysing the form of constitution under which she achieved it. Zancan (Rend. Ist. Lomb., 1936, 499 f.) assumed that P. was also concerned to explain certain contemporary signs of decadence; but this is an object he never mentions, and can only have been incidental. To explain Roman success P. had to analyse the mixed constitution; this meant analysing its growth; and here he found the theory of the anacyclosis invaluable, since the early course of Roman history corresponded to the demands of that theory (cf. 11 a n.). But the anacyclosis also implied eventual decay; and it is this fact which has led to the view (cf. CQ, 1943, 73–89) that its acceptance by P. must be part of the revised plan of his history, adopted after 146 (cf. iii. 1–5 n.), and that this revision sounded a critical note, and put <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> up at the bar of justice to answer for her method of exercising her rulewith an end to it all in <w lang="el-GR">ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις</w> (iii. 4. 12 n.). But in fact P. must have been confronted with the issue of Roman decay before 150–146 (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 105–7). Already in i. 64 he had criticized the inability of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> as mistress of the world to put to sea such fleets as she had marshalled during the First Punic War; and he must have <milestone unit="page" n="647">[647]</milestone> been familiar with the statue set up to Cato after his censorship of 184 and have read the inscription which Plutarch (Cat. mai. 19. 3) translates: <w lang="el-GR">τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἐγκεκλιμένην καὶ ῥέπουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον . . . εἰς ὀρθὸν αὖθις ἀποκατέστησε</w>. Nor was Cato alone. Already in 166 the young Scipio Aemilianus was a contrast to the rest of the Roman youths, who had been corrupted by the great wealth and power of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> since the fall of Macedon (xxxi. 25–29; the <w lang="el-GR">ἀδήριτος ἐξουσία</w> of xxxi. 25. 6 recalls the <w lang="el-GR">δυναστεία ἀδήριτος</w> of vi. 57. 5); on this see Pöschl, 64–65. Hence the theory of the anacyclosis, which P. saw illustrated in the rise of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a>, and which he probably regarded as the specific form of the general theory of biological change (above § (b)), could perhaps already find a further justification (if an incidental one) in the signs that even as early as P.'s arrival in <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> 'things were not what they had been'. It is therefore unnecessary (and misleading) to postulate that (as was argued in CQ, 1943, 82–84) the anacyclosis was part of the revised scheme; indeed the difficulties of such a view render it untenable (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 109 ff.). The mikte is therefore to be regarded as the constitution to which the Romans worked by way of the early stages of the anacyclosis; and in so far as she achieved the mikte <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> succeeded in temporarily placing herself outside the influence of the forces normally making for change. To that extent the Roman constitution is a breach of the anacyclosis pattern, which was <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w>. Yet from another point of view the achievement of the mikte gave <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> something which, as we saw, was lacking to the anacyclosis as it normally operated an acme; and this brought it (despite the zigzags in its pattern) into relation with the biological concept of origin, growth, acme, and decline. Hence it could (from that point of view) be said to have had a growth that was essentially <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w> (cf. 9. 13–14). This is the explanation of the apparent paradox that P. describes as having had, <w lang="el-GR">εἰ . . . τινα καὶ ἑτέραν πολιτείαν</w> (9. 13), a development <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w>, the one state which has evidently succeeded in making a breach in the 'natural' development of the anacyclosis. There is a contradiction herebut one which lies within P.'s rather complicated theorizing in a realm in which he was not a real master; and it is this contradiction which enables him to treat the anacyclosis as the specific form in which the biological law finds expression within the realm of political theory.

6.5.4 - 6.9.9

Detailed exposition of the anacyclosis.

6.5.6 - 6.5.6

Analysis of the growth of ethical concepts. This leads to the transformation of <w lang="el-GR">μοναρχία</w> into <w lang="el-GR">βασιλεία</w>; on the extent to which this involves a process akin to the Stoic idea of justice see § 11 n.

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

Breakdown of the <w lang="el-GR">βασιλεία</w> into <w lang="el-GR">τυραννίς</w>: this, like the breakdown of aristocracy and democracy (8–9), depends on human nature, and the vices which arise naturally in the 'second generation' in power; there is a good discussion of the process in Ryffel, 192 ff.

6.5.8 - 6.5.8

Accession and decay of the aristocracy.

6.5.0 - 6.6.0

Senate's control of the equestrian contracts. Modifications of the terms of public contracts came within the general scope of equity, and were originally in the censors' competence; but by the second century applications were normally brought before the Senate. Livy <milestone unit="page" n="694">[694]</milestone> (xxxix. 44. 8; cf. Plut. Cat. mai. 19; Flam. 19) records an example from Cato's censorship (184), when the Senate were induced to instruct the censors to re-auction the contracts. A perhaps betterknown case is that of the publicani who asked for the remission of their Asiatic contracts in 61/0 (Cic. ad Att. i. 17; schol. Bob. p. 157 Stangl); the basis of their claim was a change in circumstances due to enemy action and, as P. asserts here and Cicero (de prou. cons. 12) confirms, 'si qui frui publico non potuit per hostem, hic tegitur ipsa lege censoria', i.e. he can claim an automatic release from his contract. Furthermore, much of the business in question is continuous and goes on from one lustrum to another, whereas the censor is in office for only eighteen months. Between censorships similar matters are dealt with by the consuls, and the jurisdiction which the Senate exercises in connexion with this work is usually transmitted by them to the consuls, who act with the aid of a consilium drawn from the Senate (Mommsen, St.-R. ii. 1. 108–9). Despite P.'s account, it is true that even in the second century the comitia occasionally intervened in the matter of contracts; cf. Livy, xliii. 16. 6–7, for the tribunician rogatio 'quae publica uectigalia aut ultro tributa C. Claudius et Ti. Sempronius locassent, ea rata locatio ne esset: ab integro locarentur' (in the stormy censorship of 169, after a vain appeal to the Senate). See Mommsen, op. cit. ii. 1. 455–6, and (for the Senate's general control over public finances and their administration) iii. 2. 1112–23.

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

Appointment of judges from the Senate. Civil jurisdiction (which included much that we should regard as falling under criminal law) followed a procedure which divided a case into two halves, the hearing in iure, which ended with the definition of the parties and the issue at law in a formula, and the appointment of unus iudex or iudices, and the hearing in iudicio before the iudex or iudices, who arrived at a verdict. Normally the praetor was the magistrate acting in iure, who appointed the iudex (iudices); and prior to the Gracchan revolution the list of iudices was the senatorial roll. Traditionally this senatorial privilege went back to Servius Tullius (Dion. Hal. iv. 36. 2); but the monopolizing of juries in civil cases may well be in reality one aspect of the rise of the nobiles (cf. Mommsen, St.-R. iii. 2. 897 n. 2, where the reference of Plautus, Rud. 713, to Roman conditions made in ii. 1. 229 n. 3 is withdrawn), and in any case it seems likely that where both parties were agreed, the enrolling of a senatorial iudex (or iudices) might be dispensed with (see below). Here, however, P. has in mind more than ordinary civil disputes, for he speaks of <w lang="el-GR">δημόσια . . . συναλλάγματα</w>. These are cases dealing with what are really offences against the state. For those which came under the heading of criminal law the procedure was that of a magistrate's cognitio followed (on prouocatio) by a hearing before <milestone unit="page" n="695">[695]</milestone> a iudicium populi (see 14. 6 n.); here the appeal was to the people, and no question of iudices arose. But matters of administrative jurisdiction involving the state as one party, though often in fact concerned with offences against the state and its property, are in certain specific instances dealt with under the procedure of civil law. After a hearing in iure the praetor would appoint unus iudex or recuperatores, before whom the hearing in iudicio was to take place; the unus iudex must be a senator (before 122), and quite often, no doubt, the recuperatores likewise; see Livy, xliii. 2. 3 (171), where five recuperatores ex ordine senatorio are set up to inquire into cases of extortion. The extortion trials provide an example of delicts which came under administrative jurisdiction with the procedure just outlined, and no doubt P. has them prominently in mind (cf. Mommsen, St.-R. iii. 1. 529 n. 3). It was, moreover, in connexion with cases de repetundis that L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi introduced in the tribal assembly in 149 a law setting up a permanent quaestio, which combined the procedure of magisterial cognitio with the jury system of civil law; and the iudices of this new quaestio were naturally chosen from the Senate. Later, with various changes in the source of the iudices, these quaestiones extended their scope to embrace most criminal jurisdiction too; see further A. N. Sherwin-White, BSR, 1949, 5 f.; M. I. Henderson, JRS, 1951, 71 ff. It is, however, doubtful if P. is here referring to this development, since he had probably written book vi before 149 (see introductory note). In St.-R. iii. 2. 898 Mommsen suggests that he may also have in mind the procedure used in many cases of administrative jurisdiction where the methods of civil law were inappropriate, e.g. the jurisdiction exercised by censors or consuls in what were really matters falling within censorial competence (see 17. 5–6 n.), when a single magistrate acted with the help of a senatorial consilium. The senatorial commissions mentioned in 16. 2 n. investigated criminal cases and are hardly in place here. See Mommsen, St.-R. i. 169–91, ii. 1. 228 ff., iii. 1. 527 ff., 2. 897 ff.; Strafrecht, 177 ff., 209 ff. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ὅσα μέγεθος ἔχει τῶν ἐγκλημάτων</w>:</emph> i.e. in civil suits of no great magnitude the parties probably dispensed by agreement with the enrolling of a senatorial iudex or iudices.

6.5.9 - 6.5.9

Consuls' control of everyone militiae: cf. 12. 7 for their unlimited imperium in this sphere. <milestone unit="page" n="696">[696]</milestone>

6.5.18 - 6.5.18

Merits of the Roman mixed constitution both in time of danger (§§ 2–4) and in peace (§§ 5–8). The emphasis in this chapter is on the stability and success of the Roman constitution; but P. never claims, nor does his argument require, that it should be permanent. He is concerned with the mechanics, the system of checks and balances by which, so long as it remains at its prime, it maintains the status quo despite any tendency to excess in any constituent element; but one day it too will decline <w lang="el-GR">κατὰ φύσιν</w> (cf. CQ, 1943, 75 f.; 1954, 120). The thesis of 'danger from abroad' holding the state together is not new nor is it unparalleled. In 167 Cato made a famous speech defending the Rhodians, in which he attributed this argument to Scipio Africanus, who (he said) had in 201 urged generous treatment for <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Carthage&groupId=441&placeId=820">Carthage</a> in order to keep <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Rome&groupId=935&placeId=1669">Rome</a> healthy and united (App. Lib. 65: regarded as a reading back into the past of arguments of c. 150 by Gsell and Saumagne; cf. CQ, 1943, 87 n. 6); and Valerius Maximus (vii. 2. 3) attributed similar sentiments to Africanus' friend, Q. Caecilius Metellus. In any case they go back to Greek commonplaces; cf. Plato, Laws, iii. 698 B ff. (fear of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Persia&groupId=871&placeId=1571">Persia</a> creates unity at <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Athens&groupId=379&placeId=715">Athens</a>) and Arist. Pol. iv (vii). 15. 3. 1334 a 25 ff. (states grow rusty in time of peace). The same theme figured in Scipio Nasica's famous opposition to the destruction of <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Carthage&groupId=441&placeId=820">Carthage</a> before the Third Punic War (cf. Plut. Cat. mai. 27. 3 f.; App. Lib. 69; Diod. xxxiv. 33. 4–6; see Gelzer, Phil., 1931, 261–99). Here P. seems to be arguing against this view with his claim that the mechanics of the mixed constitution are sufficient to counteract excess in any direction (§ 6, <w lang="el-GR">αυτὸ παρ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">αυτου . . . τὴν βοήθειαν)</w>; see Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 104–5. P.'s argument is substantially complete, but a transitional passage has been lost, leading to the account of the military system; and this may have been preceded by a section giving a detailed description of the constitution (cf. § 9; introductory note; 11 a n. at the end).

6.5.9 - 6.5.9

= iii. 87. 7–9: see 18 n. for the possibility that the reference forward is to a passage originally occurring here.

6.5.19 - 6.5.42

The Romanmilitary system. The account falls into two sections: <milestone unit="page" n="697">[697]</milestone> 19–26 describes the organization of the army, 27–42 the Roman camp. It appears to rest on P.'s own observation and inquiry.

Specifics

6.5.1 - 6.5.1

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">παρὰ Πλάτωνι καί τισιν ἑτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων</w>:</emph> for Plato's contribution to the theory in the Republic, Laws, Politicus, and Seventh Epistle, see 4. 7–9. 14 n. But, as there indicated, it is unlikely that P. went back directly to Plato; and the refined version of the anacyclosis is probably to be attributed to some younger philosopher of the third or second century, who is no longer identifiable. P. stresses the fact that he is merely popularizing and shortening a theory to be found elsewhere; for its attribution to 'Plato and certain other philosophers' cf. 45. 1, where views on <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Sparta&groupId=660&placeId=1208">Sparta</a> are attributed to several writers, of whom Ephorus alone seems to be relevant.

6.5.2 - 6.5.2

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">πρὸς τὴν πραγματικὴν ἱστορίαν</w>:</emph> 'serious history ; on this phrase see i. 2. 7–8 n. and ix. 1–2. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὴν κοινὴν ἐπίνοιαν</w>:</emph> 'common intelligence of mankind' (Paton).

6.5.3 - 6.5.3

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τῆς καθολικῆς ἐμφάσεως . . . τῶν ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένων</w>:</emph> i.e. if the general exposition of 4. 7–10 leaves difficulties, these will be resolved in the section 5. 4–9. 14 ( <w lang="el-GR">ἑξῆς)</w>. The sense is missed by Taeger (6) and by Pöschl (70), who believe that the gaps in the theoretical exposition are to be filled in in the course of the archaeologia (11 a). Modifying the view of Pöschl and Taeger, Eisen, 51 ff. argues that the <w lang="el-GR">καθολικὴ ἔμφασις</w> is the account of the anacyclosis in 5. 4– 9. 14, but that the detailed discussion which will make up for it is to be found not only in the archaeologia (as they thought) but in all the rest of book vi where there is reference to the anacyclosis. Despite my doubts in CR, 1967, 35–36, based in part on the fact that elsewhere <w lang="el-GR">ἑξῆς</w> in P. seems to refer to something immediately following, I am now disposed to think that this is the best way to take this passage; § 3 forestalls any possible objection to an account <w lang="el-GR">κεφαλαιωδῶς</w>, when the subject is not without its difficulties (cf. <w lang="el-GR">τῶν νῦν ἐπαπορηθέντων)</w>.

6.5.5 - 6.5.5

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">φθορὰ . . . τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους</w>:</emph> cf. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 A for the <w lang="el-GR">παλαιοὶ λόγοι</w> telling of <w lang="el-GR">τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλύσμοις τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος</w>; he then goes on to discuss early society after the Deluge. The theme is later a common one. See, for example, 'Ocellus', 21. 4 ff. <w lang="el-GR">φθοραὶ καὶ μεταβολαὶ βίαιοι γίνονται . . . ὁτὲ μὲν ἀνάχυσιν λαμβανούσης τῆς θαλάσσης εἰς ἕτερον μέρος, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς γῆς εὐρυνομένης</w> ('swelling') <w lang="el-GR">καὶ διισταμένης ὑπὸ πνευμάτων</w>to which Theiler (Gnomon, 1926, 588) compares Ovid, Met. xv. 262 ff., 296 ff.; 'Ocellus', 21. 11, <w lang="el-GR">πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ γέγονε καὶ ἔσται βάρβαρος ἡ Ἑλλάς, οὐχ ὑπ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀνθρώπων μόνον γινομένη μετανάστατος ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως</w> (i.e. through earthquakes); Ps.-Hippodamus in Stob. Anth. iv. 31. 71 (W.–H., iv. 847); Ovid, Met. xv. 420 ff. (on the ruin of peoples); <milestone unit="page" n="650">[650]</milestone> in general, Theiler (Gnomon, 1926, 588–94), stressing the role of the second-century Peripatos.

6.5.6 - 6.5.6

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ</w>:</emph> 'reason shows'. Ryffel (214 n. 373) points out that this is a Stoic technical expression (cf. von Arnim, SVF, iv, p. 92, index S.V. <w lang="el-GR">ὁ αἱρῶν λόγος</w>: especially iii, p. 93, 27 ff.; p. 134, 31 f.) and claims Stoic influence here; but the Stoic sense of the phrase was different and meant 'the power of reason makes a convincing choice', whereas there are (as Ryffel admits) parallels for P.'s usage in Herodotus (ii. 33. 2), Plato (Rep. x. 604 C), and elsewhere (cf. LSJ, S.V. <w lang="el-GR">αἱρέω)</w>. The phrase may not therefore be adduced as evidence for a Stoic source. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">συμφθειρομένων . . . τεχνῶν</w>:</emph> cf. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 C, <w lang="el-GR">οὐκοῦν ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ηὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔ?ρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν</w>; <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">αὐξηθῇ σὺν χρόνῳ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων</w>:</emph> cf. Plato, Laws, iii. 678 B, <w lang="el-GR">προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, πληθύοντος δ᾽ ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους</w>.

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων συναθροιζομένων</w>:</emph> 'so too in the case of these, when they gather together'. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένειαν</w>:</emph> contrast Cic. de re pub. i. 39, 'eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio'. The 'naturalistic' view that men united because of weakness occurs in Plato, Protag. 322 A–B, <w lang="el-GR">οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ᾽ ἀρχὰ?ς ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δ᾽ σὐκ ἦσαν</w> <emph rend="italics">\?\</emph> <w lang="el-GR">ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι . . . ἐζήτουν δὴ ἁθροίζεσθαι καὶ σῴζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις</w>. Zeus then gave men Aidos and Dike, so that they could live together in cities. Probably Plato had it from Democritusif he is the source of Diodorus, i. 8. 1–2, <w lang="el-GR">τοὺς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεννηθέντας τῶν ἀνθρώπων φασὶν ἐν ἀτάκτῳ καὶ θηριώδει βίῳ καθεστώτας? σποράδην ἐπὶ τὰς νομὰς ἐξιέναι . . . καὶ πολεμουμένους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος διδασκομένους, ἀθροιζομένους δὲ διὰ τὸν φόβον ἐπιγινώσκειν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν τοὺς ἀλλή?λων τύπους</w> (cf. Reinhardt, Hermes, 1912, 492 ff.; Norden, Agnostos Theos (Berlin, 1913), 399) and it goes back to general sophistic teaching (cf. Taeger, 18 ff.). The alternative view derives social unity from an innate 'political' instinct, inasmuch as human beings cannot be self-sufficient; cf. Plato, Rep. ii. 369 B, <w lang="el-GR">γίγνεται τοίνυν . . . πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν</w> 〈<w lang="el-GR">ὢν</w>〉 <w lang="el-GR">ἐνδεής</w>; 369 C; Arist. Pol. i. 2. 8 ff. 1252 b 27 ff.; iii. 6. 1278 b 17 ff. True, this is not wholly irreconcilable with the weakness theory. Aristotle admits that men first <w lang="el-GR">συνέρχονται . . . καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ</w>?, nor does the passage from the de re publica rule out imbecillitas as a contributory factor (non tam . . . quam). In the de officiis, however, man's natural sociability and the role of the household are stressed as being 'prin- <milestone unit="page" n="651">[651]</milestone> cipium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae' (off. i. 54); and since this almost certainly goes back to Panaetius (Hirzel, ii. 721 ff.; Pohlenz, Antikes Fhrertum, 87 n. 3), it appears that P.'s account at this point is not that of the Stoics, who will rather have followed Aristotle in deriving the state from the family: cf. Cic. fin. iii. 62, 'natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur'. The attempt of K. Sprey (De M. Tulli Ciceronis politica doctrina (Diss. Amsterdam, 1928), 125–6) to refute the view that P. is here expounding the 'weakness-theory' of social origins is not convincing. See further on this passage von Fritz, Constitution, 45 ff., with the comments in JRS, 1955, 151. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὸν τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ διαφέροντα</w>:</emph> it has been argued (e. g. by Taeger (17 f.), Philippson (Phil. Woch., 1930, 1180), and Pohlenz (Antikes Fhrertum, 103 n. 1)), that this general characterization of the <w lang="el-GR">μόναρχος</w> was applied later in the book to Romulus, and is echoed in Cicero, de re pub. ii. 4, 'corporis uiribus et animi ferocitate . . . praestitisse'. It is true that the parallel between Romulus and the <w lang="el-GR">μόναρχος</w> cannot be pressed too closely, for it is uncertain how closely Cicero is following P., and in any case Romulus' domination is not merely the result of fear (cf. 6. 11 <w lang="el-GR">τὴν βίαν δεδιότες)</w>, but he won willing obedience (cf. Pöschl, 66–67). Further, the picture in Cicero is the traditional one (cf. Livy, i. 4. 9 (of the twins), robore corporibus animisque sumpto); and if he did take it from P. it does not follow that P. intended to stress it, for elsewhere (52. 10) he uses the same words to characterize the Italian race in general. Nevertheless, there is reason to think that P. saw a parallel between early Roman history and the early stages of the anacyclosis, and that in this parallelism Romulus was cast for the role of <w lang="el-GR">μόναρχος</w>, though not fitting it in all particulars (cf. 11 a n.; Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 114). <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἀδοξοποιήτων</w>:</emph> 'unreasoning'; this distinction between men and animals is repeated at xviii. 15. 16. The comparison with animals to justify the rule of the stronger goes back to the fifth-century sophists, in particular Thrasymachus (cf. Plato, Gorg. 483 D). In the Laws (iii. 680 E) primitive society develops <w lang="el-GR">καθάπερ ὄρνιθες</w> in herds, based originally on kinship groups with the father rulingthough a little later (Laws, iii. 690 B) Plato distinguishes between the rule of father and mother over children and that of the stronger over the weaker, which he describes as <w lang="el-GR">καὶ πλείστην γε ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῴοις οὖσαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔφη ποτὲ Πίνδαρος</w> (cf. Gorg. 484 B). Similarly in the bee-state (Polit. 301 E) the 'king' is <w lang="el-GR">τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων</w> (like P.'s monarch); in default of which the human community must resort to laws. For the development of such parallels in Greek sociological thought see Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig, 1907) 219; A. Menzel, S.-B. Wien, 1936, 31–34. <milestone unit="page" n="652">[652]</milestone>

6.5.9 - 6.5.9

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ὅρος</w>c<w lang="el-GR">ἰσχύς</w>:</emph> 'strength is the standard of his rule' (not 'sole limit', as Paton and Shuckburgh); Schweighaeuser is right as usual: robore metiuntur imperium; cf. Arist. Pol. vi (iv) 8. 1294 a 10, <w lang="el-GR">ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος? ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος</w> (a parallel I owe to C. O. Brink). <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">μοναρχίαν</w>:</emph> in making monarchy the primitive social form P. follows Plato (e.g. Laws, iii. 680 D ff.) and Aristotle (Pol. i. 2. 1252 b 20); but they both associate primitive monarchy with the regime of the family (cf. § 7 n.), as do the Stoics (if indeed Panaetius is Cicero's source in de re pub. i. 54 (see too fin. iii. 62, quoted in § 7 n.)), whereas P. links up rather with the sophistic teaching on the role of the stronger, by making the sociable virtues and ethical concepts a subsequent development (§ 10 ff.), the fruits not the cause of living in society.

6.5.10 - 6.5.10

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">βασιλείας</w>:</emph> distinguished from monarchia by its ethical and social basis, which has developed in the course of time by a natural process. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἔννοια . . . τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου</w>:</emph> Stoic phraseology; cf. Cic. fin. iii. 21, 'simul autem cepit intellegentiam uel notionem potius, quam appellant <w lang="el-GR">ἔννοιαν</w> illi (sc. eorum quae sunt secundum naturam), . . . multo eam pluris aestimauit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat'. But the importance of this is not to be pressed (cf. 4. 7–9. 14 n. (b)), for P.'s idea of concepts of right and wrong springing from the experience of social life is found among the Epicureans (cf. Porph. de abst. i. 10).

6.5.2 - 6.5.2

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας</w>:</emph> a traditional starting-point for sociological discussion: cf. Cic. de re pub. i. 38, 'nec uero, inquit Africanus, ita disseram . . . ut ad illa elementa reuoluar, quibus uti docti homines his in rebus solent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar'. Following Panaetius he uses it in de officiis (i. 11): 'commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sint'. For the continuation of this passage see § 4 n.

6.5.3 - 6.5.3

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν εἰκὸς τοὺς συνόντας</w>:</emph> 'those who are familiar are likely to be displeased and to take offence'; cf. § 6 (where <w lang="el-GR">δυσαρεστεῖσθαι</w> is middle), vii. 5. 7 (where both verbs are used in the sense 'displease, give offence').

6.5.4 - 6.5.4

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ</w>:</emph> similarly in Cicero, off. i. 11–12, 'sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu mouetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps . . . facile totius uitae cursum uidet . . . eademque natura <milestone unit="page" n="653">[653]</milestone> ui rationis hominem conciliat homini et . . . ad uitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos qui procreati sunt' (the whole passage is worth comparing with P.); cf. ibid. i. 107, 'omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inueniendi officii exquiritur'; fin. ii. 45. These parallels are against the attempt of Taeger (28–29) to exclude Stoic influence from P.'s exposition at this point; on the other hand, the stress on reason as the mark of man is not exclusively Stoic (cf. Epicurus, Sent. 16 = Diog. Laert. x. 144; Sinclair, 273), nor is P.'s insistence on the utilitarian, selfish motives which lead to the formulation of ideas of right and wrong (cf.§§ 5–6) comparable with the treatment taken over by Cicero from Panaetius; see too 5. 10 n. Here again the source does not have the appearance of being exclusively Stoic. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">παρατρέχειν . . . τὴν . . . διαφοράν</w>:</emph> 'that the difference in behaviour will escape them'.

6.5.5 - 6.5.5

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον</w>:</emph> Cicero offers a parallel for this: off. i. 11 (quoted in § 4), 'homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum uidet earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus coniungit atque adnectii futuras'.

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἔννοια . . . τῆς τοῦ καθήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας</w>:</emph> Schweighaeuser: fortasse <w lang="el-GR">θεωρία</w>, plausibly since in § 9 <w lang="el-GR">θεωρία</w> seems to be equivalent to <w lang="el-GR">ἔννοια</w>. Wilamowitz (Lesebuch, ii. 1. 120 ad loc.) reads <w lang="el-GR">θεωρία</w>, but argues that <w lang="el-GR">ἔννοια</w> is the <w lang="el-GR">ἀρχή</w> and <w lang="el-GR">θεωρία</w> the <w lang="el-GR">τέλος</w> of <w lang="el-GR">δικαιοσύνη</w>. This view, rejected by I. Heinemann (Poseidonius' metaphysische Schriften, i (Breslau, 1921), 21. 2), seems forced. <w lang="el-GR">ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος</w> is 'the be-all and end-all', a proverbial tag (cf. i. 1. 2, iii. 5. 6; Wunderer, i. 73–74), and elsewhere P. uses <w lang="el-GR">ἔννοια</w> alone (5. 10, 7. 1) without any such nuance. On <w lang="el-GR">τὸ καθῆκον</w>, a Stoic expression (= officium), see iv. 30. 4 n.

6.5.8 - 6.5.8

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὰς ἐπιφορὰς τῶν . . . ζῴων</w>:</emph> the theme of defence against wild beasts as a feature of early society appears in Plato, Protag. 322 B and Laws, iii. 681 A; but it is not there linked, as here, to the growth of ethical concepts. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἐπισημασίας . . . εὐνοϊκῆς καὶ προστατικῆς</w>:</emph> 'marks of favour and honour' (Paton).

6.5.9 - 6.5.9

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">εὔλογον . . . θεωρίαν</w>:</emph> stylistic variants on <w lang="el-GR">εἰκός . . . ἔννοιαν</w>. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">διὰ τὸ συμφέρον</w>:</emph> the identity of utile and honestum is Stoic, and the theme naturally occurred in Panaetius: cf. Cic. off. iii. 12–13, 34 (= fgg. 101–2 van Straaten); but the Stoics would scarcely, like P., have made honestum merely a generalization based on what is utile. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">διανεμητικὸς . . . τοῦ κατ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀ?ξίαν ἑκάστοις</w>:</emph> 'apportioning his deserts to each'; cf. iii. 17. 10. v. 90. 8. This is a Stoic definition of <milestone unit="page" n="654">[654]</milestone> justice (cf. von Arnim, SVF, iii, fg. 262, <w lang="el-GR">ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ</w>; M. Aurel. i. 16; Galen, xix. 384), but not exclusively Stoic. For instance, Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics discusses the 'distributive' form of 'particular' justice: cf. Eth. Nic. v. 5. 1130 b 31, <w lang="el-GR">τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας</w>; v. 6. 1131 a 24, <w lang="el-GR">ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀ?ξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον</w> <emph rend="italics">\?\</emph> <w lang="el-GR">τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν</w> . But Aristotle regards this as only one form of justice. Already the basic of this definition is implicit in Herodotus' story (i. 96. 2 ff.) of how Deioces attained to tyranny among the Medes by a reputation for just decisions. For a similar Pythagorean definition of justice see 10. 7 n. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τῇ δυναστείᾳ</w>:</emph> the role of the primitive, patriarchal, monarch is described in Plato, Laws, iii. 680 B, <w lang="el-GR">δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν</w>. P. also uses the word <w lang="el-GR">δυναστεία</w> of oligarchy (9. 4).

6.5.1 - 6.5.1

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου . . . κατὰ φύσιν ἔννοια</w>:</emph> the growth of these concepts as a result of self-interest has been outlined in 6: how they become the foundation of <w lang="el-GR">βασιλεία ἀληθινή</w> is explained in the next sentence, which incidentally shows that P. regarded the hereditary principle as an integral part of such a kingship. Such a principle first appears in the tradition of the Roman kingship with the Tarquins, and then de facto rather than de iure; this is against Taeger's view that the scheme of social development in the archaeologia followed the anacyclosis rigorously (Pöschl, 67).

6.5.3 - 6.5.3

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὰς σωματικὰς καὶ θυμικὰς δυνάμεις</w>:</emph> cf. 5. 7.

6.5.4 - 6.5.4

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τόπους . . . ὀχυρούμενοι καὶ τειχίζοντες</w>:</emph> the sophistic theme of the early synoecism of cities and building of strongholds; cf. Plato, Protag. 322 B (quoted in 5. 7 n.); Hipp. mai. 285 D, <w lang="el-GR">κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις</w>; Laws, iii. 680 E–681 A, <w lang="el-GR">τειχῶν ἐρύματα τῶν θηρίων ἕνεκα ποιοῦνται</w> . <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">καὶ χώραν κατακτώμενοι</w>:</emph> cf. Arist. Pol. iii. 14. 1285 b 7 (on heroic monarchy), <w lang="el-GR">διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορί?σαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἑκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι</w> ; vii (v) 10. 1310 b 38, <w lang="el-GR">ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν</w> . <milestone unit="page" n="655">[655]</milestone>

6.5.6 - 6.5.6

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἐπεὶ δ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἐκ διαδοχῆς κτλ</w>.:</emph> the second stage, contrasted with <w lang="el-GR">τὸ μὲν οὖν παλαιόν</w> (§ 4). Safety <w lang="el-GR">(τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀσφαλείαν)</w> and luxury <w lang="el-GR">(πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν)</w> are the direct result of the original king's efforts (§ 4).

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων</w>:</emph> 'even from those for whom such things are quite improper'. <w lang="el-GR">οἱ προσήκοντες</w> are not relatives but, on the contrary, those who might properly satisfy the king's <w lang="el-GR">ἀφροδισίων χρεῖαι</w>. For an example of the excesses here hinted at cf. x. 26. 3 (Philip V).

6.5.8 - 6.5.8

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἐγένετο . . . ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς</w>:</emph> on the difference cf. v. 11. 6.

6.5.1 - 6.5.1

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μοναρχίας εἶδος</w>:</emph> 'kingship and monarchy'; tyranny is the corruption of kingship, and P. treats both as being overthrown together (cf. 4. 8, <w lang="el-GR">τῆς τούτων καταλύσεως)</w>. Despite the danger of confusion between the <w lang="el-GR">τυραννίς</w> of 7. 8 and the primitive <w lang="el-GR">μοναρχία</w> of 5. 9, P. here uses the term <w lang="el-GR">μοναρχία</w> as the equivalent of 'tyranny'. The reason is probably that, in describing the familiar phenomenon of tyranny and its expulsion, P. has slipped into the familiar terminology (cf. ii. 43. 8); for in the rest of the Histories, outside the description of the anacyclosis (4. 7–9. 14), his usual word for a tyrant is <w lang="el-GR">μόναρχος</w> (cf. 4. 7 n.; Walbank, CQ, 1943, 76–79, where, however, the conclusion concerning the date of composition is invalid).

6.5.4 - 6.5.4

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">παῖδες παρὰ πατέρων</w>:</emph> for the 'law of the second generation' cf. 7. 6. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἐν ταῖς . . . ἐξουσίαις καὶ προαγωγαῖς</w>:</emph> 'amid the evidences of power and high position' (Paton). On <w lang="el-GR">προαγωγή</w>, 'preferment', see Welles, 356; cf. xv. 34. 5.

6.5.5 - 6.5.5

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">μετέστησαν . . . τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν</w>:</emph> Plato emphasizes the role played by greed in this process: Rep. viii. 551 A, <w lang="el-GR">ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο</w> (a view criticized by Aristotle, Pol. viii (v) 12. 1316 a 40 ff.). In Pol. vii (v) 11. 1314 b 23, Aristotle makes lust and drunkenness causes of the overthrow of the tyrant; but, as Ryffel observes (192 ff.), the mechanism of decay is identical for kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, and the vices follow a traditional pattern, as P. admits (§ 6).

6.5.8 - 6.5.8

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">εἰς τὴν . . . ταύτης πίστιν ἐνδεδεμένοι</w>:</emph> 'being bound to the Senate by ties securing their protection'; <w lang="el-GR">πίστις</w> = fides, and implies the relationship of client and patron. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">δεδιότες τὸ τῆς χρείας ἄδηλον</w>:</emph> 'uncertain and afraid that they may need their help' (rather than Paton, 'looking forward with alarm to the uncertainty of litigation': <w lang="el-GR">χρεία</w> in the sense 'legal conflict' would be without parallel).

6.5.1 - 6.5.1

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὴν ἁρμογὴν αὐτῶν</w>:</emph> in contrast to their separate qualities. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">πολιτείας σύστασιν</w>:</emph> 'form of constitution', cf. 43. 5, 47. 1, 51. 5.

6.5.5 - 6.5.5

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">πρὸς ὕβριν καὶ πρὸς ὑπερηφανίαν</w>:</emph> as after the victory over Per- seus; cf. xxxi. 25. 3 ff.; Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 105–7.

6.5.7 - 6.5.7

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἐξοιδοῦν</w>:</emph> 'swelling-up', a medical metaphor; cf. Pöschl, 58 n. 34. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">ἀντισπασθαι . . . δυναμένης τῆς ἑκάστου προθέσεως ὑπ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἀλλήλων</w>:</emph> cf. 10. 7 n. (on Lycurgan <a class="linkToPlace" target="_blank" href="/place?placename=Sparta&groupId=660&placeId=1208">Sparta</a>).

6.5.8 - 6.5.8

<emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὰ μὲν κωλυόμενα τῆς ὁρμῆς</w>:</emph> 'being on the one hand hindered in any aggressive impulse'. <emph rend="bold"><w lang="el-GR">τὰ δ</w>f <w lang="el-GR">ἐξ ἀρχῆς . . . ἐπίστασιν</w>:</emph> 'and on the other afraid from the out- set of a check (or 'censure') from their neighbours'.

Addenda & corrigenda

6.5.3 - 6.5.3

modifying the view of Pöschl and Taeger, Eisen, 51 ff. argues <milestone unit="page" n="774">[774]</milestone> that the <w lang="el-GR">καθολικὴ ἔμφασις</w> is the account of the anacyclosis in 5. 4– 9. 14, but that the detailed discussion which will make up for it is to be found not only in the archaeologia (as they thought) but in all the rest of book vi where there is reference to the anacyclosis. Despite my doubts in CR, 1967, 35–36, based in part on the fact that elsewhere <w lang="el-GR">ἑξῆς</w> in P. seems to refer to something immediately following, I am now disposed to think that this is the best way to take this passage; § 3 forestalls any possible objection to an account <w lang="el-GR">κεφαλαιωδῶς</w>, when the subject is not without its difficulties (cf. <w lang="el-GR">τῶν νῦν ἐπαπορηθέντων)</w>.

Polybius, Histories

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