Bibliography
| Title: Polybius, Rome, and the East Volume: 69 Pages: 1-15 Type: Journal Article Year: 1979 Abstract: In this article, Derow tackles the difficult issue of whether Polybius believed that Rome?s eastern expansion was the result of a conscious action by Rome, based on a consciously conceived strategy, as noted in a 1963 article by F. W. Walbank (1). He contrasts this with the interpretation as presented by Maurice Holleaux (2) based on the narrative of Polybius himself and as represented later by Livy. Derow argues that the inconsistencies that have been noted between Polybius? various statements about Roman intent do not exist. He articulates the view that because Polybius is consistent, he is then the best interpreter of his own evidence. Derow defends the consistency of views, as expressed by Polybius, about the second Punic War in 1.3.6 and 3.2.6. He argues that these passages should be taken together to conclude that at the time of victory against Carthage the Romans knew that they had reached a milestone directing them towards world rule. Derow argues that Polybius believed that at the point where Rome was achieving many victories, the intention of establishing world domination was then born, not before. He turns his attention to the second Macedonian war which Polybius described in 1.3.6. Derow interprets Polybius? text to mean that the historian believed that this particular war was the first display of a universal aim for power by Rome. He notes that this view is contradictory to Holleaux, and all major works about the second Macedonian war that have followed. Derow concludes that in an attempt to counter preceding theories of Roman interventions in eastern politics Holleaux took too stringent a position at the opposite end of the spectrum. Derow further explores the discussions Polybius provides of reasons that Rome went to war, cautioning that there is a distinct difference between reasons and responsibility. He argues that Polybius is offering explanations of why Rome may have waged battles, including the factors that may have led to those decisions. Such explanations do not seek to answer questions about ?war-guilt? and responsibility. He concludes his article by offering his view that Polybius may have believed that Rome was strategic in ensuring other people started wars, to which they had to react. According to this position Rome led people to believe that the wars they waged, which extended their considerable power, were in a sense defensive. Polybius, in Derow?s view, was the master and best interpreter of his own evidence. Keywords: Polybius, Roman policy, The East |