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| Title: Urbs Direpta, or How the Romans Sacked Cities Secondary Title: War and Society in the Roman World Pages: 69-91 Type: Book Section Year: 1993 Abstract: 69 -- 2 detailed accounts of Roman city's sacked: Tacitus, re: Cremona in AD 69 (Hist. 3.33.1-3), and Polybius 10.15.4 - 16.9 (re: capture of New Carthage in 209 BCE). Polybius' account is generally taken as definitive in modern scholarship. -- Many of the brief and bare accounts of sacking (the operation must have been considered too well known to merit thorough description) involve the verb diripio. 'The aim of this chapter is to reassess the Polybian model by examining the semantic field of diripio in the context of the sacking of cities, and by confronting it with the information afforded by the numerous, albeit brief and fragmentary, descriptions of Roman sackings of cities in our other sources.' 70 -- THE MEANING OF DIREPTIO -- vb. diripio: originally tear apart, mangle, tear to pieces, evolved to deprive, take away, divest, 'with a very strong emphasis on the unruly and violent character of the act'; most common meaning: sack, plunder, loot. -- 2 passages in Livy are crucial for this verb in this context: -- sack of Victumulae by Hannibal's army in 218 (21.57.13-14): -- they surrendered, and gave up their arms, and then the signal was given to sack the town 'as if they had taken it by storm' (ut tamquam vi captam urbem direperent). NB: Hannibal's guilt is not in doing these things, but in doing them to a city that had surrendered, *as if* it had been taken by storm. -- every kind of cruelty and lust and outrage . . . . -- complaint of Locrians to Roman senate in 204 about Roman garrison there: they rob, plunder, kill, rape women and boys (29.17.15-16). 71 -- thus: direptio seems to consist in letting the soldiers loose, giving unrestricted freedom to loot, rape, slaughter. -- so also Tacitus on Cremona: 40,000 soldiers burst into the town (without permission or authorization): grabbed everything they could -- boys and women (some killed by being pulled in different directions); many took as much plunder as they could, but were stopped by others stronger than themselves; some tortured owners to reveal whereabouts of hidden treasures. -- how typical? Victumulae might be example of Hannibal's army's stereotypical brutality; the report of the Locrians is exaggerated. At Cremona, the soldiers are plainly disobedient. 72 -- Livy seems to present topoi of direptio, at Locri and Victumulae, whether the events actually happened then or not: 'We thus have no reason to be sceptical about the image of direptio in these passages. The fact that they contain a good number of literary topoi, as explicitly stated by Livy in the case of Victumulae, does not diminish their value. On the contrary, with the help of such loci communes we can establish the kind of connotations diripio and the like brought to the minds of the last generation of Romans that knew war from direct, and dire, experience.' -- Tac. on Cremona is different -- writing for a generation that didn't know war at first hand, and so wrote in minute detail, also to develop his theme of the fratricidal character of the civil war in AD 68-9. -- necessary to see which elements of the sack of Cremona find counterparts in other brief accounts of direptio. 1. Arson/destruction of houses, etc. Not a standard feature. If the sack of the city was followed by its burning, the sources usually mention both separately (Livy 6.4.9; 10.44.2; 22.20.9; 23.15.6; 23.17.7; 24.35.2; 31.45.12; 31.48.7; 32.15.4; 32.33.11; 38.43.4; 45.34.6): therefore, not a standard feature of direptio. 2. Sexual violence/rape is standard. Intrinsic to direptio, 'on a par with looting itself.' -- see also Justin 26.1.7; Cato ORF, frag. 203. 73 -- the decisive connotation of the word diripio in the context of sacking cities is 'the ravagers' freedom of action.' -- doesn't see how raping, as distinct from looting and killing, could be commanded: 'it is hard to envisage a general giving his troops the order to rape' (but cf. Bosnia, Bangladesh after Ali) -- 'The thoroughly individualistic character of as essential an element as sexual violence implies that the character of the whole direptio was individualistic,
in particular that other activity most gratifying to the direptores, looting.' -- most passages are useless for determining whether the direptio was free or controlled: in many, the direptio is executed by the commander (Livy 24.35.2; 43.4.9; 44.46.3), but 'this is a metaphor, since those who did the sacking were the troops'. -- another category of passages (Livy 10.44.2; 25.31.8; 44.45.8) in which generals let soldiers plunder, or give cities to the soldiers for plunder. -- again indicates soldiers' unrestricted freedom of action in direptio. 73f. -- Killing: will return to it -- some mention it as a separate activity, and diripio never means killing alone (though it can mean raping or looting alone); OTOH, killing is a natural corollary of freedom of soldiers. 74 -- 'we may take it as established that the term's range of connotations implies the plunderers' unlimited freedom to loot and rape. Whether they were equally free to satisfy their lust for blood remains for the time an open question.' THE POLYBIAN MODEL -- passage quoted on p. 75 Pol. 10.15.4 - 16.9: a three-part scheme: killing first (vicious and complete -- kill all, spare none, not even dogs and other animals. This is 'the Roman custom'. 'They do this, I think, to inspire terror'. Then comes the general's signal to stop the massacre and begin pillaging. But no more than half the troops go in to collect the loot. Each soldier brings back the loot to his own legion. Finally, the plunder is distributed equally to each. 76 -- Polybius implies that looting was the only activity of the second phase, followed by distribution (nowhere supported by Livy's accounts); noticeably absent is rape, so common in Livy. Polybius also emphasizes that everything takes place by order. THE ROMAN WAY OF SACKING CITIES: A REAPPRAISAL -- Polybius' model applies only to taking a city by assault, whereas all the examples in first section concern cities that surrendered to attackers. An important distinction for analysis of Roman practice. -- cities taken by storm: the first part of Polybius' model (kill indiscrimately, then plunder) is supported by Livy and others: Veii in 396 BCE (Livy 5.21.13), Tarentum in 209 (27.16.6), Chalcis in 200 (31.23.7-8), New Carthage in 209 (26.46.10 -- though Polybius' account may have influenced this one). -- whereas Polybius refers to indiscriminate slaughter, Livy sometimes claims that it was males of military age or adult males (puberes) who were the Romans' main targets (e.g., Antipatreia, 31.27.4). Z prefers Livy's evidence -- hard to believe that in normal circs. the Roman soldiers took no notice of all whom they were killing. -- Roman sources do mention cases in which all inhabitants were killed, but these were unusual, if not rare. 78 -- 'In normal circumstances, when the object of the massacre was, as stated by Polybius, terrorizing the survivors into submission, butchery of puberes was in fact the most efficient way of securing it, whereas killing of women and of the oung of both sexes would have been a senseless waste in view of the next phase of the sack, in which rape played so prominent a part. All other considerations apart, sexual attractiveness was surely the victims' best chance of survival.' -- for cities that surrendered, Romans killed all the adult males: Leontini in 213 (Livy 24.30.4), Cauca in 151 (App. Hisp. 52), Corinth in 146 (Paus. 7.16.8; Zonarius 9.31.5-7), Capsa in 107 (Sall. Iug. 91.6-7). -- easiest to suppose that the Romans in that case followed their pattern for cities taken by storm (??? but Z has emphasized the difference!) -- NB, Sallust excuses the commander Marius in the case of Capsa for acting 'against the law of war' (contra ius belli), implying that the slaughter of all males would have been perfectly proper where the city had surrendered. -- general's signal: Livy mentions it several times, in cities taken by storm or by surrender: Victumulae, Syracuse in 212 (Marcellus limited the sack to plundering, in response to request -- strong guards were put in place, and the signal was giving for plundering to begin
[Livy 25.25.5-9]) 79 -- Phocaea in 190: unusual because the city came to terms with praetor L. Aemilius Regillus on condition the their persons and property not be harmed. BUT the soldiers disobeyed their commander and 'as if they had received a signal from the praetor . . . rushed off in every directin to plunder the city.' (Livy 37.32.1-12) -- the signal, though not given here, is mentioned --as the point at which plundering would have begun. -- the general gives the signal, or is expected to do so, once he is satisfied that all resistance is gone (the premise being that this security was not self-evident). -- Was the signal necessary when the situation did not warrant it? Was it an order (or consent) or only an intimation? 80 -- the necessity of the signal goes well with Polybius' picture of orderly progression. But if normal sacking was the soldiers' free pillaging and raping at their discretion, the signal (as indicator that enemy resistance was done) 'would have been just an invitation to the troops to start enjoying themselves'. -- Pol's description of booty division, etc., is virtually uncorroborated. -- soldiers plunder on their own behalf: Livy 5.20.8 - 10; 5.22.1; 5.23.8-11 -- in capture of Anxur, 406, Livy says that the general, N. Fabius Ambustus, postponed sacking until the arrival of two other armies so that all could participate (4.59.8, 10) -- so no idea of later distribution. -- after capture of the refuge area of the Tolostobogii on mt. Olympus in 189, Cn. Manlius Vulso kept his army from pillage, ordering them to pursue those fleeing, and another general prevented his column of soldiers when they reached the city; but a third, C. Helvius, 'was unable to prevent his men from plundering the camp' -- and the booty fell to those who had come last and not participated in the fighting (Livy 38.23.2-4). -- contrary to what Livy later suggests (38.23.10), Vulso could not recllaim, much less recover, the plunder from Helvius' men; all he could do was to recompense the other for their 'loss'. 81 -- a couple of weeks later, the disappointed soldiers had learned their lesson and, when taking the stronghold of another Galatian tribe, the Tectosages, on Mt. Magaba, they pursued them only as far as the camp limits, remaining in it to plunder, 'The consul was unable to tear away from their plundering the troops who had entered the camp' (38.27.3, 5). -- Marcellus, when taking Syracuse finally in 212, first sounded the recall signal, sent the quaestor with a guard over the royal treasures and the houses of Rome's friends, the THEN allowed the soldiers to plunder. (25.30.12, 31.8-9). This seems to show clearly that the plundering was practically a complete free-for-all unless very cleverly controlled in advance. I SAY Cf. Josephus, V 333-35. -- even in cases of clear insubordination, there was little a commander could do to recover plunder from legionaries cloaks (Livy 3.32.12-14 on Phocaea). Regillus did his best to stop troops and save people's lives, but could not return good taken by troops. 82 -- capture of Cothon, port of Carthage, in 146 (which Polybius saw), acc. Appian, (Pun. 127). Scipio Aemilianus seized the walls adjacent to the port and put 4000 men in the captured area: 'They entered the temple of Apollo, whose statue was there, covered with gold in a shrine of beaten gold, weighing 1,000 talents, which they plundered, chipping it with their swords and disregarding the commands of their oficers until they had divided it among themselves, after which they returned to their duty.' 'In spite of sacrilege and insubordination bordering on desertion in the face of the enemy, the only thng Scipio could do was to exclude the offenders from the distribution of rewards after the final victory' (App. Pun. 133). -- NB: since the enemy had fled the previous day, the soldiers had good reason to believe the area was safe, so they were entitled to begin looting; when it later became clear that fierce fighting awaited, no one left his post. 82: thus, what Roman commanders could reasonably expect from their troops: when t
here was resistance, the killing went on until the general gave the signal for it to stop or until everyone around had been killed. 'In more relaxed circumstances many solders proably got sidetracked into plundering (and raping) from the start; what is more, they did so with impunity.' -- plenty of evidence, beginnning with the sack of Syracuse, that troops were free to kill and rape in the pillaging phase. 83 -- the plundering only, at Tycha and Neapolis, was very rare and a special case. -- reason: inhabitants of other towns in the region were still holding out, and if the Romans had slaughtered and raped, they would have continued to do so. So, they limited it to looting. BUT, as soon as they had negotiated a conditional surrender, Marcellus violated it 'with cold-blooded hypocrisy. With the need for diplomacy gone, the direptio of the old city followed standard Roman practice.' Although Cicero and Plutarch praise Marcellus' benevolence, Livy admits that 'many shameful examples of anger and many of greed were given' (25.31.9). One specific case: the death of an old man at the hands of a plundering legionary (25.31.9-10; cf. Plutarch, Marc. 19.5-6). -- best evidence for soldiers' freedom to kill regardless of the general's signal or the stage of the sack is in those cases in which all inhabitants of a city, or nearly all, were killed. In the Republic, 8 such massacres, though 2 are preventative, aimed at precluding suspected treachery (the first two): Casilinium in 216 (23.17.10), Henna in 214 (24.37.1-39.6), Myttistratos in 248 (Zonar. 8.11.10; cf. Pol. 1.24.11; Diod. 23.9.4), Lipara in 252 (ZOnar. 8.14.7; cf. Pol. 1.39.13), Ilurgeia in 206 (28.19.9-20.7; Appian, Hisp. 32; Zonar. 9.10.2), Locha in 203 (App. Pun. 15), Athens in 86 (App. Mith. 38; Plutarch, Sull. 14.10), and Avaricum in 52 (Caes. BG 7.28.4). 84-- in 3 of the 6 cases, it is explicitly said that the soldiers were responsible, in spite of their commanders: at Mytt. the general had to save the remaining populace during plunder phase; at Avaricum, Caesar says that his enraged soldiers spared no one; at Locha the soldiers massacred in flagrant disregard of Scipio's orders and his agreement with the defenders, and he brutally punished the offenders. -- at Ilurgeia and Athens, the generals are blamed, but matters were more complex. At Ilurgeia, although Scipio urges his soldiers to exact revenge for the residents' killing of Roman refugees 6 years earlier, it seems clear from the narrative that the soldiers' rage was the key factor, that they would have done this without much encouragement. 85-- Athens: Appian says it was L. Cornelius Sulla who gave the order to kill all, but we might wonder, since he showed mercy to those who survived the massacre. And perhaps a special case, if the soldiers weren't going to be interested in people who had been starving for so long, eating boiled leather and even other human beings. NB: CANNIBILISM. (App. Mith. 38). And note: the Athenians had sided with Mithridates, who was credited with having killed 80,000 Italians, and the Athenians had put up a particularly stubborn resistance to the Romans. So the soldiers might have been prepared to yield to rage over lust and greed. -- in general, it seems that wholesale massacres were the doing of soldiers, then, not generals. -- all the cities apart from Athens (where some survived) and Avaricum were small. 86 -- it could well be that in larger cities wholesale slaughter was never an option because of the sheer numbers; the soldiers would tire eventually. 'The ultimate corroboration of the soldiers' freedom to slaughter, rape and plunder at will was, in my view, tehir almost total impunity in the few cases when, while doing so, they defied their commanders.' -- only in one case do we know of a commander getting very upset and punishing their disobedience, Scipio Africanus at Locha. But that was the opening of the final campaign of the Second Punic War, and the first that the Romans fought on enemy soil, and he could not afford to tolerate disobedience at that point. -- in this contex
t, the soldiers were willing to comply. -- but later, when Rome was firmly in command of the world, not so: L. Valerius Flaccus in 86 BCE tried to imitate Scipio and give the plunder back to its owners, but he paid with his life! (Dio 35.104.3-4; Diod. 38.8). 87 -- Polybius' ideal is evidently quite unreflective of actual practice. -- no plundering by part of the army, no equal participation of all in the plunder, and no chance that in the Roman army no one ever took anything to the detriment of his colleagues. 88 -- but it seems that Pol. was just badly informed by the nobility who told him about Roman practices -- reflecting their ideals and perhaps their experience in a a couple of places -- New Carthage, in particular, which was the supply base for Carthaginian forces, and which Scipio could not let fall prey to his troops. Therefore, it 89 - was not a true direptio. -- even in the days of Cicero and Caesar (Cic, Att. 5.20.5; Caes. BG 7.11.9), generals tried to keep up the pretence that plunder was given at their pleasure. -- 'the fiction of the general's control of his troops' CONCLUSION 89 -- the Roman way of sacking cities should be reconstructed 'on the basis of concrete events' and not Pol's idealized model. -- 'at best an unwarranted generalization from a most exceptional episode' -- other sources reveal considerable diversity of practice. 90 -- 'Diversity resulted mainly from the soldiers' mood at the time of the sack and, obviously, the city's size and wealth.' But some basic rules: 1. the essence of direptionw was 'the suspension of any form of control from above'; orderly sacking is a misnomer. As long as it lasted, the soldiers held the power of life and death over the inhabitants, and could do whatever they wished to them with impunity. 2. Z can think of only two limits to a soldier's freedom -- physical strength/endurance and logistical constraints, which limited what soldiers could take in the baggage train. 'One thing seems certain: once a thing got lost under the legionary's cloak, there was no power on earth which could snatch it away from there.' |